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The lack of encryption of data at rest or in motion is one of the top 10 database 
vulnerabilities according to team SHATTER [72]. In the quest to improve the security 
landscape, we identify an opportunity area: two tools Hibernate and Jasypt that work 
together to provide password-based database encryption. The goal is to encourage 
developers to think about security and incorporate security related tasks early in the 
development process through the improvement of their programming system or integrated 
development environment (IDE). To this end, we modified the Hibernate Tools plugin for 
the popular Eclipse IDE, to integrate it with Hibernate and Jasypt with the purpose of 
mitigating the impact of the lack of security knowledge and training. We call this 
prototype the Crypto-Assistant. We designed an experiment to simulate a situation where 
the developers had to deal with time constraints, functional requirements, and lack of 
familiarity with the technology and the code they are modifying. We provide a report on 
the observations drawn from this preliminary evaluation.  We anticipate that, in the near 
future, the prototype will be released to the public domain and encourage IDE developers 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Preamble 
Information and computer security have acquired relevance lately mainly due in part to 
attacks against high profile businesses such as Sony, Apple, and Amazon. Tools have 
reduced the difficulty and skills necessary to launch an attack. On the other hand the 
difficulty for developers to build secure software has increased with more and more 
vulnerabilities discovered every day. “Security is a chain; it's only as secure as the 
weakest link.” [58]. An attacker could compromise the whole system by exploiting the 
weakest link. In contrast, developers’ main goals imply meeting functionality and time to 
market requirements; security is a secondary goal [82] that might be desired, but not 
required [88] depending on the criticality and perceived risk of the application developed.  
This thesis work aims to provide some insight to the question: how can we help 
developers to produce secure software? Based on the premise that the actions of 
developers are influenced by the tools they use, by providing them the tools that focus on 
security, we may be able to change developers’ perspectives and behaviours with the aim 
of increasing the security of information systems.  
To make a better use of resources, we focused on a particular problem: the lack of 
encryption of sensitive information while using Hibernate. Hibernate Object/Relational 
Mapping (ORM) tool, facilitates the storage and retrieval of Java objects. One of the 
easiest ways to achieve the encryption of sensitive information is to use custom Hibernate 
data types provided by the Jasypt (Java simplified encryption) library. A more detailed 
description of these tools is provided in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, the process to encrypt 
sensitive data with Hibernate and Jasypt is still fairly complex, not particularly intuitive, 
and prone to errors. This was the main motivation for us to build a prototype tool to help 
developers in this task. The prototype consists of a series of modifications to the 




aim to increase the usability of Hibernate. When we refer to usability we mean “the ease 
of use and learnability of a human-made object”. The usability increase is achieved 
through a set of editors and wizards that reduce the learning curve associated with its use. 
Usability is one aspect that contributes significantly to the use, or not, of security tools; 
the prototype focuses on improving this property. The integration of Hibernate Tools and 
Jasypt, reduces the complexity of using encryption to protect sensitive information. The 
prototype used a security warning as a mechanism to communicate the risk of 
compromising sensitive data due to a lack of encryption. This was done to encourage 
developers to classify and protect sensitive data at the early stages of development; when 
is cheaper and easier to fix any possible issues derived from the lack of security 
considerations. The ultimate goal was to make the process as easy and intuitive as 
possible, and reduce the learning curve and potential number of errors in which 
developers could incur.  
The evaluation of the prototype included a user study to simulate the usual 
conditions that a developer has to deal with: little familiarity with the application code, 
vague requirements, and time constraints. We designed a programming task that involved 
the use of the prototype and asked the participants to perform the migration of a web 
application data layer from JDBC (Java database connectivity) API (Application 
programming interface) to Hibernate and at the same time improve the application in a 
given amount of time. A full description of the study is given in Chapter 4. We 
deliberately hid the fact that we were focusing on security and observed if the changes 
introduced in the programming system influenced the software artefacts produced. We 
collected logs, artefacts and questionnaires from participants to gain an insight on their 
perception of the tools used and tasks performed to understand their behaviour.   
1.2 Research objectives 
This research work has several objectives: 
1. The main goal of this research is to create a tool to help developers build 
more secure and reliable applications. To achieve this goal, we developed a prototype 




Eclipse platform, we aim to maximize the audience that could benefit from the work done 
during the realization of this research. 
2. The second goal is to help developers in the application of the “Build 
Security In” [9] concept. This concept indicates that to develop secure applications, 
security must be present in every phase of the software development life cycle, from the 
inception through its development and even after during the maintenance phase; it would 
be much easier to apply this concept with the help of integrated development tools and 
processes that promote awareness and train developers to act in response to security risks. 
A well-integrated programming environment that promotes a continuous process of 
improvement and focus on security principles and practices will result in the ongoing 
production of more dependable, trustworthy and survivable software systems. 
3. Another goal is to support security researchers and tool developers by 
sharing the experience gained while developing the Crypto-Assistant prototype. It is 
anticipated that this research could be used as a reference by other security researchers 
who wish to improve or create tools for security that encourage developers to integrate 
and carry out security related activities during the development process. 
1.3 Research questions 
To achieve the goal of producing a tool to help in the development of secure software, the 
research was motivated by the following research questions:  
1. What research has been done to answer what a secure system is? 
2. What research has been done to determine the cause of software security errors? 
3. What kinds of tools have been created to help developers to produce secure 
systems? 
4. What problems have these tools solved, and which security errors remain that 
would benefit from a tool? 
5. What kind of tool could be developed to aid developers in the encrypting of 
sensitive data? 
6. How to evaluate the usability and security of Crypto-Assistant, a tool to help 




7. How well did the Crypto-Assistant work in term of helping developers encrypt 
their data? 
To answer these questions, first it was necessary to define what security is and how to 
define a secure system. To understand the causes of security errors we begin by defining 
error to understand how security errors are different from common errors and examine 
what factors contribute to the introduction of security errors in software. Several examples 
are presented to show the diversity of ideas and nature of security tools.  
One of the main problems of security tools is that they are complex and difficult to 
use by someone without considerable knowledge about the tool and security. The lack of 
usability prevents users from benefiting from the security that tools intend to provide. 
There is an intrinsic relationship between security and usability. A security mechanism 
can become detrimental to security if it is hard to use and a system that is too usable has 
to make sacrifices in terms of security. A door is a good example; for usability we can 
keep it unlocked for easy access, but, if we require security then we lock it restricting its 
use to only users with the correct key, if we require more security we can add locks or 
chains for the door but we would require more keys and effort to use it; if we need to use 
it very frequently, then one might just leave it open, disabling the security mechanism in 
exchange for better usability. The last two questions regarding Crypto-Assistant are left to 
be addressed in the Chapters 3 and 4.  
1.4 Organization of thesis 
The organization of this thesis is as follows. We begin by introducing the concept of 
security and what a secure system is, then exploring some of the causes of security flaws 
in software. First we learn about errors in general, following up with code errors and 
security errors and the possible causes of them. 
A general overview of tools for software security is provided to show the diversity 
and nature of these tools and as a reference point to compare the Crypto-Assistant 
prototype presented.  
Then we will present the Crypto-Assistant prototype starting by the problem it aims to 




to describing the prototype evaluation with a small group of three users.  Its content 
ranges from the presentation of the initial hypothesis, to the experimental design and the 
rationale behind the design decisions made. Finally, we present the observations from that 
test and discuss the possible causes that lead to them and the implications of the results. 
We conclude this work, presenting some ideas for future research, with the hope 
that other researchers will continue studying Crypto-Assistant and possibly develop other 






2 CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the information collected as a background for the prototype 
developed is presented. The next sections show an overview of the different ideas that 
contributed to the realization of this research work. This chapter begins with the research 
questions that led to uncovering the theory, followed by a discussion about the 
formulation of the hypothesis that led to the design of the prototype evaluated in this 
research. 
2.2 Computer security 
In this section, we introduce the concept of security and some definitions of computer 
security to help the reader understand the content of this chapter. Along this text we will 
be using computer security and cyber security indistinctively. 
2.2.1 Security 
Security is defined as the degree of protection to safeguard assets against danger, damage, 
loss and crime. In military terms, the Department of Defence of the United States of 
America defines security as “A condition that results from the establishment and 
maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or 
influences.”  [62].  As a form of protection, we can define security as the structures and 
processes that improve security as a condition. 
2.2.2 Computer security 
The NIST  (National Institute of Standards and Technology)defines computer security 




information system assets including hardware, software, firmware, and information being 
processed, stored, and communicated.” From a business point of view the 
ISO(International Organization for Standardization )/IEC (International Electrotechnical 
Commission 27002 standard  [39] defines information security as “the protection of 
information from a wide range of threats in order to ensure business continuity, minimize 
business risk, and maximize return on investments and business opportunities”. 
Bishop [6] analyses different components that are necessary to attain computer security: 
1. Security requirements: they refer to the goals of security; what do we want to 
protect? Against what we want to protect them?  
2. Security policies: Requirements dictate that some actions and system states be 
allowed and others disallowed. A security policy is a specific statement of what is 
and what is not allowed. 
3. Security mechanisms: Enforce the policies; their goal is to ensure that the system 
never enters a disallowed state. The mechanisms may be technical or operational 
(sometimes called procedural). 
4. Security assurances: The problem of measuring how well requirements conform to 
needs, policy conforms to requirements, and mechanisms implement the policy 
fall in the realm of assurance.  
 
When we talk about computer security, what we are trying to protect usually is the 
information stored in a computer; after all, computers are only tools that help us to 
process and access information. We protect this information by preserving desired 
qualities while avoiding or mitigating undesired ones.  
2.2.3 Security goals 
There is a general consensus that, the main group of desirable qualities or 
objectives of information security are confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
This is known as the security CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) triad 




add others like accountability and assurance; the following concepts are extracted from 
Gary Stoneburner work [68].  
 
Confidentiality is the requirement that private or confidential information should not be 
disclosed to unauthorized individuals. Confidentiality protection applies to data in 
storage, during processing, and while in transit. It comes from the need to use and store 
sensitive information, for example, defence plans, personal and financial data, trade 
secrets or intellectual property. When sensitive information is handled, there is a need to 
restrict access to those resources only to individuals that have been granted appropriate 
permissions and have genuine business reason to access and use that information. 
Confidentiality also applies to the existence of data since revealing the mere existence 
may reveal information that must be protected. Access control mechanisms support 
confidentiality by providing the means to achieve it; one of such mechanism is 
cryptography [5], which scrambles data to make it unusable without the appropriate 
encryption key; this adds another protection layer to the equation because an attacker 
would be required to have access to the data and the encryption key to be able to decrypt 
it. 
Integrity refers to the ability to ensure that data is an accurate and unchanged 
representation of the original information. Its goal is that of preventing improper or 
unauthorized change. Integrity has two facets: data integrity (the content of the 
information), and origin integrity (the source of the data, often called authentication). The 
source of the information is important for users to trust the accuracy and credibility of 
certain data. A mechanism to ensure integrity falls into two classes: prevention 
mechanisms, and detection mechanisms. Prevention mechanisms try to maintain the 
integrity of the data by blocking any unauthorized attempts to change the data or any 
attempts to change the data in unauthorized ways. The former occurs when a user tries to 
change data which she has no authority to change. The latter occurs when a user 
authorized to make certain changes in the data tries to change the data in other ways that 
are not authorized.  Detection mechanisms do not try to prevent the modification of data 




These mechanisms can report the cause of the integrity violation or simply report that 
there is an integrity problem. 
Availability refers to the ability to use the resources when desired. This means that the 
resources are available when they are needed. The most available systems are accessible 
at all times and have safeguards against power outages, natural disasters, hardware 
failures and system upgrades. Attempts to block availability, called denial of service 
attacks, can be very difficult to detect, because the analyst must determine if the unusual 
access patterns are attributable to deliberate manipulation of resources or the environment. 
A deliberate attempt to make a resource unavailable may simply look like, or be, an 
atypical event. In some environments, it may not even appear atypical. 
Accountability is the requirement that actions of an entity may be traced uniquely to that 
entity. Accountability is a fundamental requirement of security policies because directly 
supports non-repudiation, deterrence, fault isolation, intrusion detection and prevention, 
and after-action recovery and legal action. 
Assurance (that the other four objectives have been adequately met) 
We need assurance to be confident that the security instruments, both technical and 
operational, work as intended to protect the system and the information it processes. The 
other four security objectives (integrity, availability, confidentiality, and accountability) 
have been adequately met by a specific implementation when: 
 Required functionality is present, and correctly implemented. 
 There is sufficient protection against unintentional errors by users or software. 
 There is sufficient resistance to intentional penetration or bypass. 
Assurance is essential; without it, the other objectives are not met. No methodology can 
provide absolute assurance that a system is secure, but different methods provide different 
levels of confidence. The methods for evaluating assurance depend not only on the 
system, but also on the environment in which the evaluation occurs and on the process 
used to specify, design, implement, and test the system. 




Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, and taking steps to 
eliminate or reduce the risk to an acceptable level [69]. Risk management is an ongoing 
process, risk assessments should be conducted throughout the system development life 
cycle, from pre-system acquisition, through system manufacturing and deployment, and 
during its operations and support.  
Before claiming that a system is secure, it is important to identify the threats to the 
system in question. Enumerating the threats to a system helps system architects develop 
realistic and meaningful security requirements [51]. Systems security engineering 
involves identifying security risks, requirements and prevention or recovery strategies. 
Without identifying threats, it is impossible to provide assurance for the system and 
justify security measures taken. Proper identification of threats and appropriate selection 
of countermeasures reduces the vulnerability of the system.  
Threat modelling uses the perspective of an aggressor to help a designer to anticipate 
the goals of an attacker and answers questions about what the system is designed to 
protect, and from whom. Threat modelling consists of three high-level steps:  
1. Characterizing the system. 
2. Identifying assets and access points. 
3. Identifying threats.  
Once threats are identified, it is necessary to create a threat profile of the system, 
describing all the potential attacks that need to be mitigated against or accepted as low 
risk. A risk assessment is performed to map each threat either into a mitigation 
mechanism or an assumption that it is not worth worrying about it. At this point, the 
security requirements for the system can be defined.  
The threats selected for mitigation must be addressed by some countermeasure. 
Security requirements are driven by security threats. Security requirements can adopt a 
negative form and state what must not be allowed to happen.  
Assurance gives the user confidence that a system works as intended, without flaws or 




confidence-building activities whose goal is to demonstrate that:  “The system's security 
policy is internally consistent and reflects the requirements of the organization,  
1. There are sufficient security functions to support the security policy,  
2. The system functions to meet a desired set of properties and only those properties,  
3. The functions are implemented correctly, and  
4. The assurances hold up through the manufacturing, delivery and life cycle of the 
system.” [64] 
Assurance is provided through structured design, processes, documentation, and testing, 
with greater assurance provided by more processes, documentation, and testing. 
Securing systems involve trade-offs; finding an ideal balance is a challenge. It is 
often impossible to mitigate every threat, and even if this could be done, it would almost 
certainly take place at the cost of decreased usability. It is important to keep in mind that 
the cost of security should not exceed the cost of the expected risk.  
To provide assurance about the security of a system, once the system has been 
analysed, threats identified and safeguards put in place, the effectiveness of the safeguards 
must be tested. The goal is to evaluate how well they perform under stress or when used 
in ways beyond the normal specification. Security acceptance testing not only exercises 
the product for its expected behaviour given the expected environment and input 
sequences, but also tests the product with swings in the environment outside the specified 
bounds and with improper inputs that do not match the interface specification. Tests must 
include proper inputs, but in an improper sequence. One must anticipate malicious 
behaviour and design to counter it, and then test the countermeasures for effectiveness. 
The expectation is that the product will behave safely, even if not properly, under any of 
these stresses. If it does not, it should be redesigned and the cycle repeated. 
Security testing is the process of determining how effectively an entity being 
assessed meets specific security objectives. Three types of assessment methods can be 




Testing is the process of exercising one or more assessment objects under specified 
conditions to compare actual and expected behaviours.  
Examination is the process of checking, inspecting, reviewing, observing, studying, or 
analysing one or more entities to facilitate understanding, achieve clarification, or obtain 
evidence.  
Interviewing is the process of conducting discussions with individuals or groups within an 
organization to facilitate understanding, achieve clarification, or identify the location of 
evidence. Assessment results are used to support the determination of security control 
effectiveness over time. 
Despite all the efforts of security researchers and practitioners, it is impossible to 
guarantee 100% security. However, it is possible to achieve a 100% risk acceptance. 
Failure to take these elements into consideration can lead to a situation where no risk is 
judged acceptable, and thus no acceptable system can be designed [51]. 
2.3 Why do developers make security errors? 
All humans are fallible; to make mistakes is part of our nature. The mistakes we 
make are reflected in the products or artefacts produced by the actions we carry out. In 
software development, this is reflected in the quality and bug density in the applications 
produced. To better understand and clarify this issue, we will introduce some terms taken 
from [36] and [45] :  
Mistake – a human action that produces an incorrect result. 
Fault [or Defect] – an incorrect step, process, or data definition in a program. 
Failure – the inability of a system or component to perform its required function within 
the specified performance requirement. 
Error – the difference between a computed, observed or measured value or condition and 




Specification – a document that specifies in a complete, precise, verifiable manner, the 
requirements, design, behaviour, or other characteristic of a system or component, and 
often the procedures for determining whether these provisions have been satisfied 
Correctness – the degree to which a system or component is free from faults in its 
specification, design, and implementation. 
The degree to which software, documentation, or other items meet specified requirements, 
and user needs as well as expectations, whether specified or not 
Programming system –  is a set of components such as “editors, debuggers, compilers, 
and documentation, each with (1) a user interface; (2) some set of information, such as 
program code or runtime data, which the programmer views and manipulates via the user 
interface; and (3) a notation in which the information is represented" [45]. Figure 2-1 






Figure 2-1 Eclipse IDE one of the most popular programming systems. 
Having these basic concepts defined we can explain how errors are introduced into a 
system; according to Williams [84] the progression of a software failure can be explained 
as follows: 
First a mistake is made and becomes a fault (or defect) in a software artefact such 
as the specification, design or code; when this happens in code, we call it a software error 
[45]. A software error is a fault that propagates as a defect in the executable code. When a 




state that may cause a visible failure; when the runtime fault becomes visible a failure is 
perceived. However, software errors do not always translate into runtime faults and 
runtime faults not always cause failures, if this is the case then we say that faults remain 
latent. Figure 2-2 shows a graphic representation of this progression. 
 
 
Figure 2-2 Faults are propagated into executable code and become runtime failures. 
 
Testing is part of the software development process; it helps developers to reveal 
failures[65]. However, to solve failures, it is necessary that the faults that led to the 
failure are found and corrected. The process of finding the cause of a failure is time-
consuming and unpredictable; this adds uncertainty and delays to the development 
process that can reflect in monetary losses. Furthermore, even when the root cause of a 
failure is detected, the cost associated to fix it may exceed the risk associated to deal with 
the failure. These faults can remain latent in the product through a follow-on release or 
perhaps forever.  
Fixing a fault, once it is detected, may involve different activities such as redesign and re-
code. The stage of the development life cycle in which a failure is detected has a direct 
effect on the cost of fixing them; the earlier a defect is detected the cheaper it is to fix it. 
To illustrate this, we can compare building software to building a house; it is easier to 
correct a defect in the blueprints before the house has been built, than once the 




the cost can be very expensive, costing companies and users billions of dollars in repairs 
[70], lawsuits and lost sales. The costs associated with fixing an error are not only 
monetary. Imagine what happens when a failure is detected once the software is in 
production. The development team might have to send someone to work on-site with the 
client in order to find the cause of the failure. It is understandable that the client will not 
be extremely happy if this occurs. Coding errors can also cause physical damage and, in 
the worst case, fatalities [73]. 
2.3.1 Software errors. 
The process of building a software system is a complex one that involves several elements 
including people, processes, and technology. The construction of a system begins with a 
set of requirements that need to be fulfilled by the final product; those requirements 
become specifications that a programmer translates into code using a programming 
system. Each one of these phases is prone to certain types of errors and also provides 
certain defences. The specifications act as a high level defence mechanism against errors, 
but they may be incomplete, defective, or ambiguous and predispose programmers to 
misunderstand the system true requirements.  
Programmers can use their knowledge, attention, and expertise to defend against 
software errors. However, programmers may have deficiencies in their defences that may 
turn into code errors. Another element of the process is the programming system 
consisting of several components such as compilers, libraries, languages, and 
environments. Each component has a set of defences against software errors. For 
example, compilers defend against syntax errors by showing warnings to programmers, 
but they also have latent usability issues like displaying confusing error messages, which 
may misguide programmers to incorrectly diagnose the cause of an error. Finally, the 
code may have latent errors that can eventually lead to a program’s runtime failure. 





Surface qualities: The particular syntactic or notational anomalies that make a code 
fragment incorrect. Examples of this type of error are syntax oversights, trivial typos and 
mechanical errors simply describe unintended text in a program; erroneous assignment 
statements, and array references. Surface qualities of software errors are significantly 
influenced by the language syntax.  The high frequency of these errors suggests that 
language syntax can be a cause of software errors on its own. 
 
Cognitive: Programmers’ lack of knowledge about language syntax, control constructs, 
data types, and other programming concepts may lead programmers to a situation that 
cause errors such as inventing language syntax, data-type inconsistencies [67], and 
misplaced or malformed statements.  Lack of attention could result in a programmer 
forgetting the inclusion of a function or use the wrong variable or operand. Such problems 
can be attributed to distractions or a lack of vigilance. In the same category, the lack of 
knowledge and experience can turn into strategic issues, referring to problems like 
unforeseen code interactions or poorly designed algorithms. 
Programming activity: Another aspect of software errors is the programming activity in 
which the cause of the software error occurred. For example, the code may be free of 
typos and syntax errors, but the algorithm implemented might be incorrect; this could be 
attributed to the programmer’s invalid or inadequate interpretation of the requirements or 
problem at some stage in the specification activity.  
Action type: There are different actions that can be performed during a programming 
activity like creation, modification, design, exploration, and understanding. Each one of 
these actions is prone to different kinds of errors. 
Table 1 Actions in programming activity 
Creating Writing code, or creating a design and 
requirement specifications 





Designing Considering various software architectures, 
data types, algorithms, etc. 
Exploring Searching for code, documentation, runtime 
data 
Understanding Comprehending a specification, an 
algorithm, a comment, runtime behaviour, 
etc. 
 
All these aspects help us to understand a little more regarding what is behind a software 
error; however, they are limited only to a causal relationship. The interactions between the 
programmer and the programming environment that lead to the errors may have a higher 
level of complexity. For example, what appears to be an incorrect algorithm 
implementation may have its origin in the specifications due to lack of clarity or detail. 
If we want to help developers to build better software, then we need to address the root 
cause of an error, and as we have seen these are very diverse and might require an entirely 
different strategy to address each one of them. 
2.3.2 Security errors 
Security errors are a peculiar type of error, they are inherently latent because their 
effects are not immediate and might not reflect on an evident failure contrary to what 
happens with active errors; the effects of active errors are more immediate such as when a 
typo prevents the program to compile or produces an incorrect output. Reason in [55] 
defines latent errors as issues that remain dormant for a long time and whose 
consequences are not evident until certain conditions are met. Security errors fall under 
the latter category. Many times the problem with this type of error is not always an 




considerations. This may be attributed to several factors, such as the lack of a formal 
process that integrates security tasks through the different stages of the software 
development life cycle, lack of security training, absence of security policies and lack of 
experience and awareness about possible threats. 
 
For security errors, the first line of defence comes at the requirements engineering 
and design phase. Using threat modelling, security requirements are collected as 
functional and non-functional requirements that specify different aspects of how the 
system must behave. The security requirements may be formalized in a security policy. A 
security policy is a definition of what it means to be secure for a system, organization or 
other entity. For systems, the security policy addresses constraints on functions and data 
flow among them, constraints on access by external systems and adversaries including 
programs and access to data by people.  
 
In the absence of security requirements, policies or a secure design, there are two 
additional lines of defense where threats can be mitigated: the programmer, and the 
programming environment. Ultimately security decisions relay at the programmers’ 
discretion. This might be the case when the programmer also plays the role of architect 
and designer and this is common for small projects. In order for programmers, to defend 
an application against security errors they need to be aware of threats, attacks and 
countermeasures [49]. This requires awareness, education, training, and skills. Awareness 
by itself is not enough; even if developers are aware of the risks, they might not be able to 
identify instances of weaknesses or to implement the correct solutions. The industry is 
now aware of the importance of security, and despite some efforts of educational 
institutions to teach developers about security [57], cyber security is still an specialization 
rather than the norm. Today developers are by and large unaware of the myriad ways they 




2.4 Tools for security 
 Different tools have been developed to help developers reduce the number of 
security errors; these tools are very diverse and might be in the form of security standards, 
guidelines, weaknesses taxonomies, frameworks, software applications, amongst others.  
Weaknesses taxonomies help to establish a common vocabulary and an 
understanding of the ways computer security fails. Several classification schemes have 
been proposed, currently the most comprehensive is the MITRE corporation’s Common 
Weakness Enumeration (CWE) [17] that incorporates 909 elements.  The main goal of 
the CWE initiative is to stop vulnerabilities at the source by educating software acquirers, 
architects, designers, and programmers on how to eliminate the most common mistakes 
before software is delivered. CWE serves as a resource for programmers as they design 
new software and write code, and supports educators in teaching security as part of the 
curriculum for software engineering, computer science, and management information 
systems; CWE ultimately helps to prevent the kinds of security vulnerabilities that have 
plagued the software industry and put enterprises at risk. MITRE’s CWE continues to 
evolve as a collaborative community effort to populate a publicly available repository of 
software errors in code, design, architecture, and implementation for developers and 
security practitioners. CWE is used by tool vendors for tagging what their tool’s report 
and claim to cover. Nevertheless, due to the high detail level of the CWE, it has inherent 
usability issues; developers that want to use it might get lost and confused by all the terms 
introduced and even if they understand them correctly they might not be able to recognize 
instances of the weaknesses in their work. 
To help software developers and security practitioners, prioritize and allocate their 
security resources better, there are other classifications that focus on the most prevalent 
security errors like the OWASP’s (Open Web Application Security Project) Top Ten 
project [10] for web applications, SANS institute top 25 CWE [14], and the seven 
kingdoms of security errors [80] for software in general.  
The “seven kingdoms of security” taxonomy was designed with the primary goal of 




the types of errors that have an impact on security; with the belief that one of the most 
effective ways to deliver this information to developers is through the use of tools. The 
expectation is that, by better understanding how systems fail, developers will better 
analyse the systems they create, more readily identify and address security problems when 
they see them, and generally avoid repeating the same mistakes in the future. When this 
set of security rules integrates with the programming environment, it becomes a powerful 
teaching mechanism. 
Standards, guidelines, and security patterns [48], [59] help developers by 
collecting the knowledge and experiences of the security community in a reusable form; 
Some examples of these are the BSIMM [74] (Building Security In Maturity Model) 
“which study  real-world software security initiatives”. The BSIMM does not tell what 
one should do; instead, it tells what everyone else is actually doing. It allows an 
organization to determine where it stands in terms of maturity with its software security 
initiative and how to evolve over time”.  
To help developers in the search of countermeasures to common security 
problems, security patterns have been collected, classified [59] and evaluated [23],[48]. 
Security patterns have different levels of abstractions. There is no single correct level of 
detail for security patterns. Different potential consumers of security patterns work at 
different levels. A developer may be primarily concerned with patterns of code-level 
objects, an architect may build network models, and a CIO may be primarily interested in 
trust relationships between organizations. All are valid uses of the security patterns 
approach, though each target audience might find little value in patterns at a much 
different level of detail. 
2.4.1 Software tools for security 
Software tools for security can adopt very diverse forms; this section presents some 
instances of software security tools. This is by no means an exhaustive overview of the 
different tools for security available. Nevertheless, it is useful to illustrate the diversity of 




security tools is focused on two main areas [37]: tools that assist in the testing of software 
applications, and tools that help developers to create components that led to obtaining 
secure systems. However, software tools for security are not limited to these two branches 
as will be shown in this section. 
Finifter and Wagner [24] carried out a comparison of how different programming 
languages and web frameworks influenced the security of web applications. They found 
that there is a relationship between the features offered by the frameworks employed were 
the most effective defences were those that were enabled by default or inherent in 
framework design or language and, that, optional protections, even when present in the 
frameworks were not used. The different programming languages did not show any 
significant advantage of one over the other.  
Tools for testing fall under two categories: white box, and black box testing tools. 
Black box testing, also called functional testing, is testing that ignores the internal 
mechanism of a system or component and focuses exclusively on the outputs generated in 
response to selected inputs and execution conditions. White box testing, also called 
“structural testing” and “glass box testing”, takes into account the internal mechanism of a 
system or component. In recent times, the tendency is to integrate these tools in the IDE 
and perform the analysis on the fly at the same time developers write the code. An 
example of a tool that adopts this strategy is the prototype developed by Xie et al. [87], 
[53], [86], [88]. It offers interactive support for secure programming integrated with the 
Eclipse programming environment. The prototype was in the form of an Eclipse plugin 
that help developers to detect security errors while they are writing code. The prototype 
proved to be useful for novice programmers; however, their test with experienced users 
was not very successful, but that might be attributed in part to the experimental design 
they applied for the evaluation; among other usability issues of the tool. Some popular 
tools for source code analysis are HP’s Fortify, Coverity’s products, SSVChecker (Static 
Security Vulnerability Checker) and LAPSE (Lightweight Analysis for Program Security 





Other tools help to perform penetration testing of web applications or systems in 
general. The web application attack and audit framework (w3af) is an open-source web 
application security scanner. The project provides a vulnerability scanner and exploitation 
tool for Web applications. It provides information about security vulnerabilities and aids 
in penetration testing efforts. The Metasploit Project  is a computer security project which 
provides information about security vulnerabilities and aids in penetration testing and 
signature development for Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Its most well-known sub-
project is the open-source Metasploit Framework, a tool for developing and executing 
exploit code against a remote target machine. Exploit can be defined as “a piece of 
software, a chunk of data, or sequence of commands that takes advantage of a bug, glitch 
or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behaviour to occur on 
computer software, hardware, or something electronic (usually computerised). Such 
behavior frequently includes such things as gaining control of a computer system or 
allowing privilege escalation or a denial-of-service attack”. 
Other tools like the one presented by Mutti et al. in “An Eclipse plug-in for 
specifying security policies in modern information systems” [50] take a different 
approach, presenting a plugin to develop security policies using ontological web language, 
which allows to automate part of the process of validation and verification. Or the web 
goat project whose goal is to: “ create a de-facto interactive teaching environment for 
web application security.” [11]. This is done through the creation of a deliberately 
insecure web application that can be used by security practitioners to analyse and test 
security tools. 
The Protection Analysis[4] project deserves a special mention here because its 
intended aim was the same as ours: to produce security tools. The main goal was to 
produce a tool to make protection evaluation more effective and economical by 
automating the detection of security flaws. A general strategy referred as “pattern-directed 
protection evaluation” was identified. They sketched algorithms for such tool, but the 




The SDL(Security Development Lifecycle) Threat Modeling Tool [60] according 
to Microsoft is the first threat modeling tool which is not designed for security experts. It 
makes threat modeling easier for all developers by providing guidance on creating and 
analyzing threat models. The tool enables any developer or software architect to: 
1. Characterize systems and analyze data flow diagrams. 
2. Communicate about the security design of their systems. 
3. Analyze those designs for potential security issues using a proven 
methodology (STRIDE). 
4. Suggest and manage mitigations for security issues. 
The SDL Threat Modeling Tool is indeed a very good example of what represents a 
usable security tool. By allowing non-security experts to take advantage of Microsoft’s 
experience regarding security with ease of use and intuitiveness. 
There are other tools for analysis [7], design [18], and modelling; depending on what we 
are looking for there is a chance that might be a tool for that. 
2.4.2 Security tools and insecurity 
Often, users do not understand how a tool works and the kind of protection it 
provides and this prevents them from benefiting effectively from them. This can be 
dangerous because it creates a false sense of security; many times users believe that the 
mere presence of security tools automatically protects them and they are not necessarily 
aware of the risk they are exposed to. The correct use and understanding of the features 
provided by a tool falls in the realm of usability  
The lack of usability is detrimental to security. In “Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt” [83] 
a usability test of PGP 5 was performed.  Originally PGP’s goal was to enable users to 
protect their email messages’ confidentiality and authenticate the source of them. In its 
marketing material it stated that the “significantly improved graphical user interface 
makes complex mathematical cryptography accessible for novice computer users.” [83].  




users. The lack of usability had negative consequences for security; one example is that 
users ended up sending their private keys in plain text to the researchers while trying to 
send an encrypted message. Due to the lack of feedback, users could not tell if what they 
were doing was correct or not. 
Cryptography is the foundation of cyber security, it provides the primitives that help 
us to attain security goals, and nevertheless it poses a usability challenge to anyone that 
needs it. A common problem with the use of encryption is that many times it is 
approached as an end instead of a medium. The mere use of encryption does not provide 
confidentiality protection. The security provided depends directly on the placement and 
management of the encryption keys. If the key used for encryption is stored along with 
the data it is intended to protect, the protection it provides is null. Therefore it is 
necessary to design security tools to be easy to use and understand.  
2.4.3 Security tools and usability 
According to the International Standard Organisation (ISO) [38], usability can be defined 
as the extent to which a product can be used by specified users to achieve specified goals 
with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified context of use. Usability is a 
contextual property; a system deemed usable in one context may not be usable in another. 
This definition focuses on users’ goals (effectiveness), the speed with which goals are 
achieved (efficiency), and users’ satisfaction with the system within a specified context. 
Security comes with certain costs in terms of usability. Traditionally, that is the 
sacrifice we make to be secure. Security many times becomes an afterthought requirement 
[85]. This is a common mistake, to attain security many aspects need to be considered at 
different stages of a project. However, people that work on security make the same 
mistake with usability, inventing or designing security policies and mechanisms that 
people cannot use. The lack of usability is one of the most recurring problems when it 
comes to security. When security tools are used incorrectly [83],[26] it leads to an 




Gutmann et al. [29] enumerate four different stands that can be adopted while 
balancing security and usability:  
 The two should work together as equal partners. 
 Security comes first, and usability should be the compromising junior partner. 
 Usability comes first, and security should be the compromising junior partner. 
 Security is best left as a separate product, naturally layered into the application 
without disturbing it and without compromising strong design principles. 
The approach one chooses will influence the system architecture, the way in which 
systems are deployed, and the way in which security is delivered to, and experienced by 
users. Therefore, there is no easy answer to the trade-off question yet. To deliver security 
properly, we must rethink the assumption of a usability compromise.  
The main challenge for current security efforts is not to find better encryption 
algorithms or protocols but to make the existing ones usable. 
2.4.3.1 Security Usability Fundamentals 
We need to understand the basic concepts of application security and usability, Gutmann 
defines them as follow in his work “Engineering security” [28]: 
“An application, exhibits functionality if things that are supposed to happen, do 
happen. Similarly, an application exhibits security if things that are not supposed 
to happen, do not happen” 
Security usability combines technical and human factors. If a highly secure system is 
unusable, users will move their data to less secure but more usable systems. Problems 
with usability are a major contributor to many high-profile security failures today.  
“However, usable security is not well-aligned with traditional usability for three reasons:  
1. Security is rarely the desired goal of the individual. In reality, security is often in 
opposition to the actual goal. Such as a locked door oppose the main purpose of 
the door that is allowing access through it. 
2. Security information is about risk and threats. Such communication is most often 




3. Since individuals must trust their machines to implement their desired tasks, risk 
communication itself may undermine the value provided by them.  
A broader conception of both security and usability is therefore needed for usable 
security.” [81] 
Usability, just like security, is a contextual property and has different meanings in 
different contexts. For some, efficiency may be a priority, for others, learnability, for still 
others, flexibility. In a security context, the priorities must be whatever is needed in order 
for the security to be used effectively. 
Security software is usable if the people who are expected to use it [83]: 
1. Are reliably made aware of the security tasks they need to perform; 
2. Are able to figure out how to perform successfully those tasks; 
3. Don’t make dangerous errors; and  
4. Are sufficiently comfortable with the interface to continue using it. 
This is the definition we used to develop the prototype presented in later sections. 
2.4.3.2 Making Security Usable 
Most computer security is not easy for people to use. Ideally, they should be empowered 
to make and enforce their own security and privacy decisions, but the usability barrier has 
made this implausible so far. Whitten [82] presents a research work in which she 
proposes that security usability is different from usability for other kind of software. In 
consequence usability of computer security must be specially tailored to address the 
problems inherent to it.  
 
Two techniques are presented by Whitten: 
 Safe staging, which takes the basic concept of multi-level user interfaces (which are 
usually designed to aid learning and to support both novice and expert users), and 




preserve the user’s security at all times. 
 Metaphor tailoring, adds a new technique, risk enumeration, to existing techniques 
for designing visual user interface metaphors. Risk enumeration, enables us to 
tailor our visual representation of the most important aspects of security in a 
methodical and prioritized way.  
However, the techniques presented may not be equally applicable to all aspects of 
computer security; some security may be inherently unusable, and some security may 
already be usable enough. The difficulty for the developer is to identify when and how to 
apply these concepts. 
Another fundamental concept extracted from [82] is the “well-in-advance” principle; the 
concept of “just-in-time” help has become a popular usability design strategy. It is based 
on the idea that the information necessary to enable a user to perform a particular task 
should be triggered when the user begins to attempt that task. Whitten argues that this is a 
fine strategy when the task is the user’s primary goal but that it is a bad strategy when the 
task is a secondary goal that must be attended to in order to accomplish the primary goal 
safely, as is very often the case in computer security.  
 
To better understand this argument, consider Microsoft Windows Vista pop-ups 
requesting users’ permission to perform a certain task. Figure 2-3 shows an example of 
how this dialog looks. Users usually just blindly press the “Continue” button and proceed. 
It is not a surprise that, when users are already engaged in some primary task, they will be 
reluctant to grant much attention to an interruption that tells them they must learn some 






Figure 2-3 Windows Vista user account control dialog. 
 
The “well-in-advance” principle establishes that when some primary user task requires 
that some security tasks be attended to in order to be safe, the user needs to have a 
reasonable idea of the complexity and effort required to achieve those security tasks, well 
in advance of deciding to tackle the primary task. 
 Other efforts try to integrate techniques and tools and improve them to support the 
design of usable and secure systems. Failys [22], developed a framework for specifying 
usable and secure systems. IRIS (Integrating Requirements and Information Security) 
considers the system design process from three different perspectives — Usability, 
Security, and Requirements — and guides the selection of techniques towards integrative 
Security, Usability, and Requirements Engineering processes. Failys’ research makes 
three significant contributions:  
1) A conceptual model for usable secure Requirements Engineering is presented, upon 
which the IRIS framework is founded; 
2) The CAIRIS (Computer Aided Integration of Requirements and Information 
Security) software tool is presented to support the elicitation and specification of 
usable and secure systems.  
3) The description of how the results of applying IRIS can be used to improve the 
design of existing User-Centered Design techniques for secure systems design. 
 
One has several options at the moment of designing security features to integrate into 
applications. However, the designer’s interpretation of these concepts is what really 




goals within an acceptable risk threshold in a way that is easy to understand. 
2.4.3.3 How Users Make Decisions 
In this section, we take a look at some of the human mental processes that are relevant to 
how users make decisions about security, and explore the reason why security user 
interfaces do not perform very well, in some cases.  
The Bayesian decision-making model [1], assumes that someone making a 
decision will carefully take all relevant information into account in order to come up with 
an optimal decision. The formalization of this model is called “Subjective Expected 
Utility” (SEU) [63],[30] and makes the following assumptions about the decision-making 
process: 
1) “The decision-maker has a utility function that allows them to rank their 
preferences based on future outcomes. 
2) The decision-maker has a full and detailed overview of all possible alternative 
strategies. 
3) The decision-maker can estimate the probability of occurrence of outcomes for 
each alternative strategy. 
4) The decision-maker will choose between alternatives based on their subjective 
expected utility.”[28] 
However, this is an ideal situation in which the user has enough information to make a 
rational decision, yet people do not always act in a rational way or have enough 
information, and often make their decisions based on other factors, such as emotions [3], 
or past experiences. 
2.4.3.4 How Users Really Make Decisions 
When a rational decision is not possible, humans use heuristics [47]. A heuristic is a 
technique designed for solving a problem more quickly when classic methods are too 
slow, or for finding an approximate solution when classic methods fail to find any exact 




heuristic can quickly produce a solution that is good enough for solving the problem at 
hand, as opposed to finding all exact solutions in a prohibitively long time. 
Research from the US Department of Defense [44],[43] discovered that people 
under pressure do not weigh their options and choose the best one. Instead, they use what 
is called “recognition-primed decision making” (RPD). In which they generate options 
one at a time, without ever comparing any two, rejecting the ones that do not work and 
going with the first one that does. Humans take this approach to making a decision when 
they cannot hold all of the necessary information in working memory, or cannot retrieve 
the information needed to solve the problem from long-term memory, or cannot apply 
standard problem solving techniques within the given time limit. 
This approach to making decisions is used under the following circumstances: 
1) The decision-maker is under pressure. 
Normally, programmers are faced with time pressures, whether from employers, 
assignments, or communities, i.e., social pressure.  
2) The conditions are dynamic.  
The situation may change by the time a long and detailed analysis is performed. 
3) The goals are ill-defined. 
  Often security goals are not expressed due to a lack of security knowledge. 
4) The information about the different options is incomplete or unavailable. 
5) In the case of security, users have little knowledge on how to make a system 
secure and the mechanisms and actions that are required for it. 
This model, along with the SEU model, represents the most general decision making 
process. Different factors affect them, but this generalization can give us a broad idea 
of how developers make decisions during software development. 
2.5  Summary 
 Computer security can be defined as measures and controls that ensure 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information system assets including 




communicated. There is no such thing as a secure system but only systems with an 
acceptable level of risk. Many factors can contribute to the introduction of security errors, 
such as lack of quality code, skills, knowledge, and concentration, which all can result in 
security errors. Security errors are different from common coding errors because they are 
latent and its effects are not immediately perceived. To help developers build secure 
systems, several tools have been created. Some tools make visible errors hidden in the 
code to assist in the code review efforts of an organization. Other tools assist in the testing 
and design security features. Many common security issues still remain unsupported or 
minimally-supported, such as input sanitation, access control, and intrusion detection.  
One of the bigger problems of security is not the lack of safe encryption mechanisms, but 
rather the usability of these encryption mechanisms for either the user or software 





3 CHAPTER 3 – CRYPTO-ASSISTANT 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the motivation for the development of the prototype presented. The 
chapter continues with the presentation of the development process, the strategy adopted, 
and factors that influenced the development of the prototype. These factors include an 
analysis of how users react to security warnings and how they make decisions. Finally a 
cognitive walkthrough evaluation of the learnability of the Crypto-Assistant is presented 
where no major issues were detected. 
3.1.1 Motivation 
With the intention of building a tool to help programmers to add security to their 
applications, we started the search for a security error in which we could focus our efforts. 
The prototype developed has the main goal to contribute to the remediation of the 
software weakness “CWE-311: Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data” [15] in its more 
specific form: “CWE-312: Clear text Storage of Sensitive Information” [16], which is a 
very common issue, occupying the 8
th
 position in “SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous 
Software Errors” [14] and is also  part of the OWASP’s Top 10 project category: “2010-
A7-Insecure Cryptographic Storage” [77]. This vulnerability occurs when the application 
stores data in clear text in a resource that might be accessible to an attacker when 
information should be encrypted or otherwise protected. According to the “CWE-700: 
Seven Pernicious Kingdoms” taxonomy [80] this kind of weaknesses falls under the 
“CWE-254: Security Features”  category and within the “CWE-359: Privacy Violations” 
class. According to Team SHATTER [72] (Security Heuristics of Application Testing 
Technology for Enterprise Research), unencrypted sensitive data is one of the top 10 




3.2 Problem definition 
The networked database is crucial for the functioning of any application. The most 
valuable assets reside in the database. The information stored can include transaction 
records, financial data, and customer information. Protecting this data is very important, 
and failure to do so might result in financial and legal cost; but, it is also an increasingly 
difficult and non-trivial task. 
Sensitive data stored on networked servers are at risk from attackers who only need to 
find a way inside the system to access this confidential information. Additionally, 
attackers might impersonate a user of the system and therefore one must consider internal 
threats including employees that can access and exploit this data. Another situation in 
which sensitive data can be compromised is when physical backups are stolen or lost, 
surprisingly, there are many examples of this kind of confidentiality breach [78],[27],[71]. 
To allow the reader to have a more complete picture of how the development of Crypto-
Assistant evolved; some important concepts will be introduced to highlight the aspects 
that we had to take into consideration during the development of the prototype. 
The purpose of encryption is to protect sensitive information from unauthorized readers 
(confidentiality) by making it unintelligible. However, the data must remain accessible for 
the authorized applications and users who require it for a legitimate business reason 
(availability). Figure 3-1 shows the interaction of the different components of encryption. 
 





Encryption keys are required to encrypt and decrypt data therefore they need to be 
accessible in order to store or access encrypted information. When using encryption, the 
protection it provides is as good as the protection of the encryption keys. In the same way 
a company might store employee records in a locked drawer and designate a person to be 
responsible for the key, the same must happen with encryption keys.  
Figure 3-2 and Figure 3-3 depict a broad overview of the process to implement 
transparent data encryption in an application with Hibernate Tools Eclipse plugin and 











Figure 3-3 Use of Jasypt and Hibernate for encryption with Crypto-Assistant support. 
 
3.2.1 Initial Hypothesis  
Based on observations about the causes of security errors in the previous chapter and the 
information presented here about the use of Jasypt and Hibernate to protect sensitive data, 
we identified several factors that contribute to the problem of developers not 
implementing encryption and we can summarize them as follows: 




2. Lack of knowledge about available protection mechanisms and their 
effective use. 
3. Lack of usability of the protection mechanisms. 
Our initial idea was to raise awareness and let developers fix the issues. However, lack of 
awareness is not the only problem. Even if developers are aware of the risks, there are 
other problems that contribute to the problem of developers not implementing encryption. 
One of the most evident is the lack of training in secure programming techniques.  This 
should come as no surprise because if developers are not even aware of the possible issues, 
they will not know how to fix them. Or goal was to help developers that have little or no 
experience about security and as a result, we could not expect that they were familiar with 
any security mechanism. 
When a developer is aware of the risk and willing to take corrective actions the 
last obstacle to overcome is the effective use of a protection mechanism or a tool for 
security, the focus of the problem switch then to the usability of the tools. 
The hypothesis we formulated is the following: 
Rising awareness about the risk of storing sensitive data in plain text and putting a 
usable and intuitive encryption mechanism conveniently located at the reach of the 
developers in the IDE; will be reflected in an increase of encryption as protection 
mechanism. 
3.2.2 Communication strategy 
Developers’ behaviour is influenced by their environment, this includes the programming 
systems and tools that they use and as a result, if security is not integrated with them, it 
might be perceived as an interruption in the work flow by forcing them to leave their IDE 
due to the lack of tool support. Therefore, we wanted to integrate security tasks within the 
tools developers use to build applications. The IDE was proposed as an effective teaching 





Security warnings are common in computer systems to communicate a failure or 
deter users to engage in risky behaviours. The purpose of security warnings is to protect 
users and their systems. Warnings can be useful to capture user’s attention and raise 
awareness about possible risks. But, if no remediation action is provided or if the 
remediation action is too complex or time consuming, some users may ignore them 
rendering the effectiveness to null. To increase its effectiveness, they must enable users to 
take a mitigation or remediation action. Based on this information we choose to use 
security warnings to meet the goal of raising awareness. To increase our chance of 
success, research was conducted on the use of computer warnings and how users make 
decisions. 
3.2.3 Warnings and User Reactions 
Computer security warnings are intended to protect users and their systems. However, 
users frequently ignore these warnings. In [8], the authors describe a study designed to 
gain insight into how users perceive and respond to computer alerts. From this study, 
there are some remarkable contributions that can be applied to the design of computer 
warnings in general. 
1. There is a trade-off between the amount of information presented to a user in a 
warning and the chance the user will utilize that information in a useful way. It is 
less likely that a user will interrupt his or her work to read a long technical text.   
2. Warnings must be presented only when necessary, and then with only the 
necessary information. 
3. Only present a security warning prompt when automatically eliminating or 
guarding against a risk is not possible.  
Warnings should only be presented with situations in which the best course of action 
depends on the details of the circumstances that are known to the user. Many times users 
are not familiar with the concepts used in security warnings and this can affect the 
effectiveness of the information presented. It is easy to find examples of warnings that are 




Assistant. To increase the effectiveness of our warning we investigated further on how 
users make decisions. 
The chosen strategy was to embed a warning in the workflow of the tools, deliver the 
warning message, and assist the user to perform a risk defusing operation. This strategy 
might seem too simplistic but it implies several difficulties. One of them is to find the 
right placement and timing for the warning message. We will refer to the placement of the 
warning in the workflow as the communication point. The communication point must be 
identified early enough in the development process when the error is cheaper to fix. The 
information presented must be brief, clear and easy to understand. Figure 3-4 




   
Figure 3-4 Communication strategy 
3.2.4 Component selection 
The design of the Crypto-Assistant prototype began with the search for a suitable tool to 




placing it in a decisive moment of the application development integrating it in the tool 
workflow. We focus the search in open source components; that would allow us to modify 
the code to produce a prototype more quickly. 
We were inspired by the scaffolding capabilities of MyEclipse [52], a closed source 
commercial implementation of Eclipse that only required a database schema to generate 
the skeleton for a CRUD (Create, Read, Update and Delete) application. The goal was to 
influence the development of the application in an early stage; before the cost of any 
necessary modification would become prohibitive.  
The platform selected for the prototype was the Eclipse IDE. Its opens source nature and 
popularity made it an ideal candidate for our research. Hibernate was selected based on its 
popularity, abstraction capabilities and the availability of Hibernate Tools plugin for 
Eclipse. Jasypt (Java simplified encryption library) is a library for simplified symmetric 
encryption in Java; this library expands Hibernate user types, allowing transparent data 
encryption.  
3.2.5 Design considerations 
The first design idea was inspired in MyEclipse; we wanted to use the reverse engineering 
capabilities of the Hibernate Tools. We considered it a good communication point to 
integrate encryption before the full application was completed. The idea was to suggest 
the use of encryption to users trying to generate Java classes and mapping files from an 
existing database schema. The database schema would work as input for our tool. Then 
users would be able to select what field they wanted and if the database was empty use 
Hibernate to regenerate the database structure. However, there was a fundamental 
problem with this approach. More specifically, the database may contain existing records 
requiring encryption and changes in the schema. This last realization added a new 
challenge for our tool because to increase the usability of the tool, we needed to simplify 
the whole process or rely on the user to find a solution. However, based on the 




project [53] we cannot trust that users would know how to complete the task by 
themselves. 
To understand better what would be required to simplify the process, we needed to 
consider the effects of encryption in data and what would be required to simplify the 
migration process.  
Encryption of fields or columns with Jasypt requires changes in the structure of the 
database. Encryption and decryption algorithms are known as ciphers. Ciphers often use 
an operation mode that produce output in fixed block sizes and require the input data to 
match this output size or it will be padded. The effects of encryption operations might be 
more evident on small data items which may increase the size of the stored data. 
Encryption transforms character data into meaningless binary data; this has consequences 
not only in the size of encrypted data, but also in the data type used to store the 
information. Jasypt stores encrypted data encoded in character form using Base64 or 
hexadecimal format, which increases the data size by approximately one third than if it 
were stored in its original binary form. Jasypt encodes the data in Base64 by default and 
therefore, it is necessary to resize and update the database columns to accommodate the 
encrypted data.  
The Jasypt default configuration uses a random salt for every value encrypted. A salt is 
random data that is used as an additional input to an encryption function, which makes 
slower the decryption of data by the use of brute-force, dictionary and rainbow tables’ 
attacks. The use of a random salt allows that the same data encrypted always result in a 
unique cypher text, making impossible to perform search queries based on the encrypted 
field since the encryption of the same value produces different outputs due to the addition 
of the random salt. One must put special care before encrypting information in indexed 
fields. Indices are used to improve the speed of lookups, and searches may be seriously 
degraded by the computational overhead of decrypting the field contents each time 
searches are conducted. Depending on the strategy adopted, the encryption of indexed 
data might not be feasible (i.e. the use of a random salt makes such operations impossible 




encrypted. New planning considerations are needed to determine what fields must be 
indexed; a decision that might not be easy to take. 
Referential integrity is another important factor to consider. If a field with integrity 
constraints have to be encrypted, that is, a field that is part of a relation (e.g., a foreign key 
is encrypted) then all of the tables that are part of the relation would require changes in 
their structure and update of its values in addition to the use of a fixed salt.  
The resources needed to provide our prototype the capabilities to automate the process of 
modifying an existing data base schema and its data, was beyond our scope.  We required 
that the solution proposed to the user was simple enough to be described in a warning 
message. 
Therefore we had to reconsider our first strategy and located a better communication point; 
Hibernate Tools allows for the creation of mapping files from Java classes to improve the 
usability of Hibernate. Using this as a communication point still gave us an input structure, 
the Java source, but did not imply the existence of a database structure; the structure can 
be generated from the mapping files. This decision eliminated the need to include all the 
features required to simplify the change of structure in the first design. 
3.2.5.1 Recommended Encryption algorithms  
The encryption algorithm was an important factor to consider for our problem. 
Our implementation allows the developer to choose their encryption algorithm from the 
ones available for the virtual machine. Many databases use Data Encryption Standard 
(DES) to protect sensitive data. However, DES has long been considered insufficient to 
protect any information for a considerable amount of time. Advanced Encryption 
Standard or AES and triple DES (3DES) are, at the time of writing, the recommended 
algorithms by NIST for symmetric encryption [2]. Triple DES offers a better protection 
against cryptographic attacks than DES; however, the use of this algorithm comes with a 
trade off in performance. AES encrypts and decrypts data in 128-bit blocks, using 128, 
192 or 256 bit keys. The nomenclature for AES for the different key sizes is AES-x, 




Government applications. Triple DES encrypts and decrypts data in 64-bit blocks, using 
three 56-bit keys. NIST recommends that applications should use three distinct keys.  
Due to export restrictions Java puts a limit on the key size allowed for encryption, 
this produces a run-time exception if a key size of 128 bit is meant to be used and the Java 
runtime is not properly configured to enable strong encryption. To minimize the chance of 
using a weak encryption algorithm, we implemented a warning mechanism to alert the 
user if the algorithm selected for encryption is different from AES. The mechanism is 
limited to inform the user that AES is the recommended algorithm but it requires the 
strong encryption configuration.  
If a user wants to use AES they would have to get the unrestricted security policy 
files from Oracle and install them in their Java Virtual machine: 
1)  Download the unlimited strength JCE policy files. 
Go to: http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/javase/downloads/index.html 
2)  Uncompress and extract the downloaded file. 
This will create a subdirectory called jce. This directory contains the 
following files: 
        README.txt                   Detailed install information 
        COPYRIGHT.html               Copyright information 
        local_policy.jar             Unlimited strength local policy file 
        US_export_policy.jar         Unlimited strength US export policy file 
 
3)  Install the unlimited strength policy JAR files. 
To utilize the encryption/decryption functionalities of the JCE framework 
without any limitation, replace the original JCE policy files (US_export_policy.jar 





    The standard place for JCE jurisdiction policy JAR files is: 
 
        <java-home>/lib/security            [Unix] 
        <java-home>\lib\security           [Win32] 
<java-home> refers to the directory where the Java SE Runtime Environment 
(JRE) was installed. 
3.2.5.2 Key management 
Because cryptography is based on keys that encrypt and decrypt data, the database 
protection is only as good as the protection of the keys. Security depends on two factors: 
where the keys are stored, and who has access to them. Secure key management is often 
overlooked when planning an encryption strategy. 
Some important questions to address in planning an encryption strategy include: how 
many encryption keys will be needed, and how they will be managed?  
The answer to these questions should include careful planning of where the keys will be 
stored, how to protect them, and how often the keys should change. 
The fewer keys you use to encrypt information, the easier the solution is to manage, 
but the more critical key security becomes. Crypto-Assistant uses a single key that is 
embedded in the mapping files of every class that have an encrypted field. This may not 
be the best solution from a security perspective. Part of managing keys is deciding where 
to store them. One easy solution is to store the keys in a restricted database table or file. 
But, all administrators with privileged access could also have access to these keys, 
decrypt any data within the system, and then cover their tracks. The recommended 
approach is to use a Hardware Security Module to store the keys. In this case, the keys 
never leave the hardware and therefore access can be controlled so neither administrators 
nor intruders can penetrate the machine and steal them.  
We recommend the separation of the database and application servers. This 




data can be accessed the key is needed to decrypt the data is still out of reach and vice 
versa. 
Proper management involves restricting personal access to key storage locations, 
random key updates and encoded key storage servers. An effective key management 
system involves every aspect of key creation like distribution, revocation, network access, 
and personnel management. As a result, key management is outside of the scope of our 
study.  
3.2.5.3 Database encryption strategies 
There are several strategies that one can adopt when choosing a database encryption 
strategy. Each one of these strategies has their own advantages and risks that must be 
taken into consideration. 
Different aspects must be taken in consideration when planning an encryption 
database strategy. The next sections are condensed from RSA’s document: “Securing 
Data at Rest: Developing a Database Encryption Strategy”[61]. The information collected 
here has the intention to be an introduction to explain how the encryption capabilities 
implemented in our prototype work and other alternatives that could have been adopted. 
3.2.5.3.1 Inside the DBMS. 
If the DBMS (Database Management System) supports encryption, the process of 
encryption and decryption takes place within the database the main advantage of this 
process is that it is transparent to the application. The data is encrypted as soon as it is 
stored in the database; however, any data that enters or leaves the database, will be 
making it as clear text. This is one of the simplest database encryption strategies, but it 
presents performance trade-offs and security considerations that must be evaluated. One 
of the disadvantages of this strategy is the extra processing that takes place in the DBMS 
every time that storing or accessing data is necessary. This can have serious consequences 
on the performance of the entire system. This strategy implies that the DBMS has access 




an attacker capable of gaining access to the DBMS will have access to both the data and 
the encryption key, gaining access to the unencrypted data. To prevent this situation a 
dedicated “Hardware Security Module” (HSM) can be used to store the keys, however 
this option is not always possible like when virtualization is used in a shared cloud 
infrastructure.  
3.2.5.3.2 Off-loading encryption outside of the DBMS. 
The recommended strategy is to consider database architectures that off-load encryption 
processing and secure key management to a separate, centralized “Encryption Server”. 
The “Encryption Server” performs the computations required by encryption and 
decryption. The benefits of this strategy are that it removes the computational overhead of 
cryptography from the DBMS or application servers, and perhaps most importantly, it 
allows separation of encrypted data from encryption keys. The keys in this architecture 
never leave the encryption server. Locking down access and monitoring the “Encryption 
Server” is important in this scenario as well, but easily achievable. 
3.2.5.3.3 Application level encryption. 
This is the architecture that allows explicit control over the information that is encrypted. 
The application has the chance to classify and manage who has access to the information 
during what times and for what purpose. This requires authorization and authentication 
controls, otherwise, encryption at this level provides no additional security.  
In this architecture, the application server takes the responsibility to perform the 
cryptographic operations. Data is introduced in the application as plain text, then 
encrypted and sent obfuscated to the database. The keys never leave the application server 
and therefore the separation of the encrypted data and the encryption key is achieved in 
this way. Attempts to snoop or intercept writes on disk or direct access to the database 
would yield useless information. 
However, encryption at this level puts limitations in the operations that can be 
performed in the database (e.g., searches or lookups that cannot be performed on the 




application basis, if multiple applications require encryption, this will add additional 
complexity to the protection of data. Typically, application level encryption is software 
based [21] which is the case of our Crypto-Assistant prototype.  Furthermore, encryption 
is a CPU intensive task and will compete for resources with other processes. In addition, 
the application server needs access to the encryption key, therefore, if an attacker breaks 
into the server and finds the keys, the information can be decrypted that is why it is 
important to separate the database and the applications server in case one of them is 
compromised to provide an effective protection. 
3.3 Development 
Development of the Crypto-Assistant had a double purpose: testing the hypothesis 
previously mentioned, and to help developers use encryption in their applications. Using 
the hypothesis as a starting point, the first high level requirements were elicited: 
1. Raise awareness among non-security savvy developers about the risks and 
consequences of not protecting data at rest. 
2. Simplify the encryption process to protect data at rest so that developers without 
deep cryptography knowledge or security training could benefit from its use. 
3.3.1 Architecture 
In this section, we discuss the architecture of the Crypto-Assistant, providing a brief 
explanation about the role of its various components. The Crypto-Assistant is built on top 
of Hibernate Tools plugin for Eclipse IDE. The prototype uses Jasypt (Java simplified 
encryption) library [40] to provide its encryption capabilities.  
Figure 3-5 shows a broad overview of the Crypto-Assistant architecture. The 
selection of these components had a double purpose. First, they are tightly related to the 
target problem: the lack of encryption of data at rest. Therefore, they are an ideal case 
study for the research presented in the previous chapter. The second reason to choose 




prototype on top of the functionality these tools provide and speed up the development 
process to have an operational prototype in a relatively short time. 
 
Figure 3-5 Crypto-Assistant - High level architecture 
3.3.1.1 Eclipse  
“The Eclipse Platform is an IDE for anything, and for nothing in particular” [20]. 
The Eclipse Platform is a general purpose IDE that contains the functionality required to 
build a specific integrated development environment (IDE). However, the Eclipse 
Platform is itself a composition of components; by using a subset of those components, it 
is possible to build arbitrary applications. One of the advantages of the Eclipse Platform is 
its integration capabilities. Building a tool or application on top of the Eclipse Platform 
enables the tool or application to integrate with other tools and applications also written 
using the Eclipse Platform. Thanks to its managed windowing system, it allows a rich and 
consistent experience for its users across multiple platforms.  
The built-in functionality of the platform is very generic. It takes additional tools 
to extend the Platform to work with new content types, to do new things with existing 
content types, and to focus the generic functionality on something specific. The platform 
provides extension points that allow developers to integrate new functionality through 




A tool provider writes a tool as a separate plugin that operates on files in the 
workspace and surfaces its tool-specific UI in the workbench. When the platform is 
launched, the user is presented with an integrated development environment (IDE) 
composed of the set of available plugins. The quality of the user experience depends 
significantly on how well the tools integrate with the Platform and how well the various 
tools work with each other. 
3.3.1.2 Hibernate & Hibernate Tools  
Hibernate is an object relational mapping tool (ORM) [32]whose main goal is to 
enable developers to persist Java objects in relational databases. Hibernate abstracts the 
underlying database and increase developer productivity by reducing 95% of the Java 
code that is typically required to access databases. Hibernate provides its own data types 
that act as translators between the applications and the underlying database. To achieve its 
functionality Hibernate uses a set of XML files for configuration and data mapping; 
additionally data mapping can be done using code annotations embedded in Java code. 
Hibernate Tools [33] makes working with Hibernate more pleasant. Hibernate 
Tools is a toolset for Hibernate 3 implemented as an integrated suite of Eclipse plugins, 
together with a unified Ant task for integration into the build cycle. An Ant task is a piece 
of code that extends the functionality of the Ant build system. Hibernate Tools makes the 
following features available within Eclipse: 
Mapping Editor: An editor for Hibernate XML mapping files, supporting auto-
completion and syntax highlighting. The editor even supports semantic auto-completion 
for class names, property/field names, table names and column names. 
Console: The Hibernate Console perspective permits configuring database 
connections, provides visualization of classes and their relationships and allows to 
execute Hibernate Query Language (HQL) queries interactively against the database and 




Reverse Engineering: The most powerful feature of Hibernate Tools is a database 
reverse engineering tool that can generate domain model classes and Hibernate mapping 
files, annotated EJB3 (Enterprise Java Beans 3) entity beans, and  HTML documentation. 
Wizards: Several wizards are provided, including wizards to generate Hibernate 
configuration (cfg.xml) files that tell Hibernate how to connect to a database (which is a 
fundamental requirement of any application using Hibernate) and Hibernate console 
configurations that help Eclipse to provide auto completion and reverse engineering 
capabilities for Java projects. 
Ant task: Apache Ant is a software tool for automating software build processes. It 
is similar to Make but is implemented using Java. Hibernate Tools provide a unified Ant 
task that allows performing schema generation, mapping generation, or Java code 
generation as part of the build process. 
3.3.1.3 Jasypt Java Simplified Encryption Library 
Jasypt [40] is a Java library which allows developers to add symmetric encryption 
capabilities to  their projects with minimum effort, and without the need of having deep 
knowledge on how cryptography works. Normally, the use of encryption in Java requires 
the programmer to have a broad understanding of Java and cryptography recommended 
modes of use. Jasypt simplifies the use of encryption providing a more clear and concise 
application programming interface (API) that is easy to understand and use. With Jasypt, 
encrypting and checking a password can be as simple as... 
 





And the encryption of sensitive data directly from Hibernate 
 
These are steps in the right direction, but further steps can be taken to simplify the 
process even more.  
This is why the Crypto-Assistant was developed.  Its development was based on 
the assumption that its simplicity would encourage developers to encrypt their 
application’s sensitive data and that they do this encryption correctly. By combining the 
power of these tools together, the Crypto-Assistant simplifies the process of incorporating 
a database encryption strategy into an application under development. 
The database encryption strategy implemented by our prototype takes encryption and 
decryption out of the DBMS, the workload takes place at the application server where 
Hibernate is running and it integrates transparently with the application; this means that 
the application does not require any changes in its code. Some code changes may be 
required but only to support cryptography best practices (e.g. key rotation[2] that involves 
decryption of the data with the old key and re-encryption of it using a new key). 
3.4 Usage 
The development of Crypto-Assistant simplifies the process of using encryption with 
Hibernate.  
In order to protect sensitive data within an application with the help of Hibernate 
Tools Eclipse plugin and Jasypt, assuming that the developer already has a Hibernate 




1. First, mapping files must be generated for the persistent classes using the “New 
Hibernate Mapping File (*.hbm)” wizard. This involves: 
a. Selecting the classes for which we want to generate mapping files. 
b. Generating the mapping files. 
2. Manually modify each one of the mapped files generated for classes that contain 
sensitive data. This involves: 
a. Opening the mapping files of the classes that contain sensitive information. 
b. Choose the properties that contain sensitive information. 
c. For each one of the properties chosen, a developer has to: 
i. Modify the data type assigned by Hibernate tools during the 
mapping file generation and assign instead a Jasypt Hibernate type 
compatible with the original data type that was assigned to the 
property.  
ii. Select a password, encryption algorithm, and key derivation cycles.  
iii. While doing this, the user must be careful not to select properties 
that will be used as primary or foreign keys because this would 
break the relationships among database tables. 
3. Finally update the configuration files to recognize the mapping files that were 
created and modified previously 
 
The use of Crypto-Assistant changes the original procedure in the following form: 
1. First, mapping files must be generated for the persistent classes using the “New 
Hibernate Mapping File (*.hbm)” wizard. 
a. This involves selecting the classes for which we want to generate mapping 
files. 
b. Selecting the fields that contain sensitive data. 




Most of the Crypto-Assistant functionality is not visible to the user. The only visible 
modification consists on the addition of a new page in the “New Hibernate Mapping File 
(*.hbm)” wizard. This wizard generates Hibernate XML mapping files taking as input a 
set of Java classes.  
 
Figure 3-6 Property Encryption page added by the Crypto-Assistant. 
The new page added by the Crypto-Assistant, Figure 3-6, presents a security 
warning whose intention is to raise awareness about the risk of storing sensitive data 
without encryption, and it offers a course of action to mitigate that risk, allowing 
developers to select the properties or fields of a class containing sensitive information. 
Crypto-Assistant uses password based encryption, where the encryption key is generated 
by applying a hash function to the password provided and atleast 1000 times. On this 
screen, it is possible to configure the password, encryption algorithm, and key iterations 
used to generate the encryption key for the fields selected, the selection of these values 




The prototype helps to reduce the chance of human error in several ways.  More 
specifically, it hides properties such as the ones used as primary or foreign keys whose 
encryption would break the entity relations. This might be confusing if users are looking 
for these specific fields but it prevents them from breaking the relations in the database by 
mistake. For the encryption algorithm, AES and 3DES are the recommended algorithms 
by NIST; however, the default security policy of the JVM put limits on the cryptographic 
strength available by default. The process to enable stronger cryptography requires the 
manual installation of unrestricted policy files. Development of a tool to assist developers 
in the installation and the detection of this file requires a considerable effort; in 
consequence it was outside the scope of the prototype we present. The algorithm selected 
by default in the prototype is DES, this was done to provide an “out of the box” 
experience for the users, and avoid confusion about why the application would throw a 
run time exception related to security if a strong encryption algorithm is selected and the 
strong encryption policy files are not installed for the Java virtual machine. Other 
algorithms can be selected if available but a warning message will be shown in the wizard 
page if the algorithm selected is not AES which is the recommended one.  
To avoid using a default password, a random one is generated every time the 
wizard is used. The passwords generated are stored in the mapping files. The developer is 
responsible for keeping track of the password  in case the mapping files are regenerated 
using the wizard. . Optionally, the users can choose their own password. If the wizard is 
used to make modifications to the configuration files, a new password will be generated 
by default, users would have to enter it manually each time they make changes and want 




Once the user decides to proceed to the preview page, heuristics are applied to 
assign a suitable encrypted type to each one of the properties selected. At the end the 
mapping files generated contain embedded configuration settings to allow Hibernate to 
use Jasypt’s custom data types to perform the encryption and decryption of the selected 
properties. Error! Reference source not found. shows the preview screen of the 
mapping wizard with an encrypted type being used. 
 
Figure 3-7 Mapping files wizard, preview screen showing the use of Jasypt Hibernate types for 
encryption. 
The encryption passwords are stored in the mapping files. This is not the most 
secure approach; however, using the recommended strategy of separating the database 
server from the application server to protect the keys will provide protection for the data 




complexity associated with them would not allow the simplification that we were trying to 
achieve. Key management is out of the scope of this prototype version and therefore it 
relies on the developer’s effort to protect the encryption keys.  
 
3.5 Installation 
The installation of Crypto-Assistant is no different from any other Eclipse plugin. The 
best way to install it is to use the update manager. Once Crypto-Assistant is compiled it 
is packaged in a zip file that can be used an update site. 
1) Select Help > Install New Software. The install dialog will appear Figure 3-8 
 




2) Click Add… and type in the name and locate the zip file containing the update 
site for the Crypto-Assistant plugin, as in Figure 3-9. 
 
Figure 3-9 Add repository dialog. 






Figure 3-10 Installing Crypto-Assistant 
4) Click the checkbox next to the update site you just added in this case is 
Crypto-Assistant. Click Next. 
5) The dialog box in Figure 3-11will appear. Click Yes and you will be ready to 
use Crypto- Assistant 
 





3.6 Usability evaluation 
Usability is one of the main goals of the Crypto-Assistant. To evaluate the usability of our 
prototype we used several methods. Learnability was one of the main aspects of usability 
that we tried to address. 
One of the most important aspects of the Crypto-Assistant is learnability. 
Learnability refers to the skills or knowledge that a new user requires in order to use the 
system effectively. Since our target audience were developers with little or no security 
training this aspect was important and required evaluation. 
3.6.1 Cognitive Walk-through 
The cognitive walk-through  method described in [66], [56], allows to perform an 
evaluation of the learnability of our prototype without user intervention. To carry out this 
activity there are some prerequisites: 
1. A general description of who the users will be and what relevant knowledge they 
possess.  
2. A specific description of one or more representative tasks to be performed with the 
system. 
3. A list of the correct actions required to complete each of these tasks with the 
interface being evaluated.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
The targeted users are developers in general, who have little knowledge regarding security. 
The actions to be performed by the user are the selection of the properties that require 
encryption. The correct action is the expansion of entities and clicking on the properties 
that require protections marking them as checked. 
The cognitive walk-through consists of an evaluator answering the following questions in 
a believable way.   




The display of a warning message has the purpose to influence the developer to 
incorporate the classification and selection of sensitive data for encryption as part of her 
current goals.  
2. Will the user notice that the correct action is available? 
The page does not explicitly indicate how to carry out the correct action. However, the 
selection area stands out from the other components by taking most of the space available 
suggesting some interaction must take place.  
3. Will the user associate the correct action with the effect that the user is trying to 
achieve? 
All of the controls and messages on the screen are associated with the protection of 
sensitive data throughout encryption. Therefore, one can assume that the user will 
associate the checking of the items in the tree with the protection of data. However, this 
might be an opportunity area to implement a visual metaphor, by placing a lock icon that 
would be open or closed to reflect the status of the check box.  
4. If the correct action is performed, will the user see that progress is being made 
toward the solution of the task? 
A check mark will be displayed next to the item checked. 
We explored alternative behaviours that might be not completely satisfactory in section 
3.2.2. For example users might not understand the messages or the behavior that is 
expected from them or they might simply skip the warning page and continue without 
reading the warnings. Despite the possible issues the answers to the questions posed by 
the cognitive walk-through appeared to be satisfactory, therefore, we assumed that there 
were not outstanding problems with respect to the learnability (skills/knowledge) required 
to use Crypto-Assistant. 
3.7 Summary 
In this chapter a brief introduction to the problem that motivated the creation of the 




1. Test the hypotheses introduced in this chapter. 
2. Make developers aware of the dangers to which sensitive data at rest is 
exposed. 
3. Increase the usability of encryption to a level that any developer can use it 
effectively without having to be an expert on security or cryptography.  
A brief overview of the main aspects to have in consideration at the moment of choosing 
a design strategy was presented. Then our prototype and the different components that 
form part of it were introduced. Finally, a small evaluation of its usability focusing in 





4 CHAPTER 4 – PILOT USER STUDY 
4.1 Introduction 
In this research, several philosophical stands were adopted. First a positivist stand is 
adopted, this means that we believe the ideas we are testing can be reduced and analysed 
in an experimental setting and the results obtained from them can be applied to real 
situations. Software security deals with psychological and sociological aspects and 
therefore our model cannot take into account all of the different variables that influence 
this activity. Our theory and hypothesis may be incomplete and therefore we adopt a 
pragmatic approach. This stance tries to qualitatively [31] assess the feelings of the 
subjects that were exposed to our prototype, and to identify the most relevant factors for 
our purposes. The Crypto-Assistant was designed based on the hypothesis presented in the 
previous chapter, that is, to test this hypothesis; we designed an experiment with a 
scenario that resembles a typical situation that developers have to deal with and assigned 
them a task that involved the use of our prototype. Our product is still a prototype and it 
has many areas of opportunity to improve. The evaluation we performed is formative [25] 
in the hope to advance our knowledge and the final product with the results obtained. The 
plan is to make the source code available for review and use with an open source license. 
4.2 Purpose/Background Information 
The purpose of this experiment is to test the effectiveness of our prototype against the 
hypothesis formulated and presented in Chapter 3.  
If our participants use the prototype to encrypt sensitive data we would have 
achieved the goal of influencing developers to produce more secure applications. The 
focus of the experiment is to learn about the usability of the Crypto-Assistant and more 
specifically, its effectiveness towards the aforementioned hypothesis. The following 
questions were formulated to help us in its evaluation and improvement. 




2. Is it effective at raising awareness about the risk to which data at rest is exposed?  
3. Are the features provided easy to understand and use? 
4. In case the users do not use the encryption capabilities suggested and provided by 
the Crypto-Assistant, what is the reason?  
Question three was answered in part by the learnability evaluation presented in the 
previous chapter. However this pilot user study was complementary to that evaluation. 
4.3 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
In this section we will describe how we performed our evaluation of the Crypto-Assistant. 
Several difficulties presented that were not part of the original scope of this research. The 
first problem was the difficulty to find suitable candidates for our experiment. Even 
though Hibernate is a popular ORM tool used extensively in industry, it is not very 
popular among students or hobbyists that were the source of our research subjects. 
Therefore, we had to design a workshop that would prepare the research subjects to 
perform the task we had prepared for them. This was especially difficult due to the many 
features and complexity associated to Hibernate and the time constraints of the 
participants. Didactic material had to be created especially for the occasion which was not 
contemplated when we first envisioned the experiment.  
A programming task had to be designed to resemble a realistic situation and in 
some way lead the participants to interact with our prototype. The task we envisioned was 
a maintenance task that involved the modification of a web application. Therefore we had 
to develop a small web application that would be easy to modify and needed to have the 
basic functionality of any popular application such as, for example, the registration of 
users, and the ability to log in/out and manipulation of users’ data.  
Once the design of the programming task was done we had to refine our 
experimental design to move out of the picture elements that were irrelevant to our 
purpose and could prevent the participants from completing the task. One of those 
elements was the difficulty to learn Hibernate in a short period of time. For this purpose 




files, and a cheat sheet for quick reference. Another element we wanted to mitigate was 
the effect that the experimental setting could have on the responses of the participant. 
More specifically, we wanted to ensure that the participants did not to simply please us 
with their answers and therefore we had to conceal the real purpose of the experiment. 
4.3.1 Recruitment process 
Participants were recruited from UOIT campus through the use of posters and an email 
directed to all the students at the university using the university distribution list for 
official announcements. More information about the participants is available in Appendix 
A. 
4.3.1.1 Initial contact 
Once a volunteer contacted the research personnel, they were sent an email along with the 
pre-screening consent form requesting them to complete an electronic screening 
questionnaire. The time required to complete the questionnaire was about 15 minutes and 
its purpose was to assess the eligibility of the volunteers. Upon completion of the 
questionnaire, the participants were informed about their eligibility via email by the 
research personnel.  
4.3.1.2 Eligibility 
Participants were selected based on the number of correct answers in the screening 
questionnaire. The total number of questions was 31, and the first eight questions helped 
us develop a profile of the participants, while the rest of the questions had the intention to 
gauge the participants' knowledge about SQL (Structured Query Language) & Java 
technology. From those questions, 11 were about SQL and with 12 about general Java 
knowledge, Servlets and JSP; this questionnaire along with the answers provided by the 
participants is included in Appendix A.  
The criterion to select the participants was to have a minimum of 12 correct answers 




4.3.2 The study 
The study consisted of two phases: (1) a workshop to provide the participants with the 
necessary information about Hibernate and Hibernate Tools plugin, and (2) the 
experiment, where participants had to perform a short programming task. 
4.3.2.1 Workshop 
The workshop took place at the UOIT North Campus the first week of October 2012. 
Participants were welcomed by a member of the research team and instructed to begin 
with the setup of their equipment. The session was started with a quick overview of the 
workshop, and the tools to be used. After this brief introduction, participants were 
instructed to set up the development environment needed for the workshop. Storage 
devices were handed out to participants loaded with the files required to participate in the 
session. The files included documents and source code to follow the workshop and 
perform the experiment. 
The development environment was composed by a virtual machine loaded with 
Lubuntu 12.04, Eclipse IDE and MySQL database server. The eclipse IDE was 
preconfigured with our prototype.  
During the workshop participants were not informed explicitly about the changes 
introduced by the Crypto-Assistant. This was covered during the workshop as if it was 
another feature of Hibernate and part of the process to generate mapping files with the 
help of Hibernate Tools. This was done to avoid contamination in the behaviour of the 
participants. At the end of the workshop, participants could choose to leave without 
compensation aside from the free lunch and knowledge gained, or continue and 
participate in the experiment.  
4.3.2.2 Experiment 
For the experiment, participants were required to modify a small web application to use 
Hibernate instead of JDBC (Java Database Connectivity), and perform any improvements 




simulate a typical situation developers face when they have to meet functional 
requirements and deal with vague requirements, unfamiliarity with code and technology 
used, and time constraints. 
There was an incentive for the top three applications of one  gift cards with a value 
of $150 for the best quality. A link to Wikipedia’s article about software quality was 
provided as a reference. This had the goal to encourage them to look for possible defects 
including security ones. 
The rules of the experiment were: 
 They could use any resources from the internet. 
 They could not communicate to any other person. 
 They could not speak to each other. 
The application to modify was small enough to be considered a toy program but was 
complex enough so they would struggle to understand the whole code at first sight. To 
help them to overcome this difficulty an overview of the application architecture was 
provided before they started the task and a list of the specific steps needed to complete the 
migration from JDBC to Hibernate was given to all of them, the application contained 
stub classes and an example method implementation using Hibernate was included to help 
them to understand what they have to do.  
At the end of the study participants were compensated with $30 each. A link to the 
exit questionnaire was emailed to them so they could answer it at their convenience and 
employ the time required to provide quality answers. 
4.3.3 Data collection and evaluation 
Data was collected using logs produced by the software, source code and questionnaires 
produced by the participants. Logs and questionnaires can be found in Appendix A. 
The logs collected the interaction of users with the wizard page added by the 
Crypto-Assistant to the “New mapping file wizard”.  Any selection or manipulation of the 




fields they selected for encryption, we planned to use this information to analyze what 
users did with the prototype. 
A screening questionnaire was used to assess the suitability of the participants for 
the study. Another questionnaire was used at the end of the experimental phase to gauge 
the participants acceptance of the prototype. The software artefacts produced by the 
participants were analysed too. 
4.3.4 Ethics 
All of the experiments abide by the University of Ontario Institute of Technology Ethics 
Review process for experiments involving human participants. None of the participants 
were put at risk at any moment and they were informed of their right to withdraw from the 
beginning and through the course of the experiment.  
4.4 Results 
In our small pilot study we started with four participants that qualified through the process 
described before.  
For several reasons including a fire drill and a building evacuation, the 
commencement of the workshop was delayed approximately 30 minutes. One of the 
participants did not have the equipment necessary but was provided with a laptop by the 
research personnel. Another participant had problems setting up the software necessary, 
and the research personnel tried to assist the participant in the set up but the cause of the 
error was unknown.  After several delays and malfunctions the participant decided to 
withdraw from the experimental session. The workshop continued without any additional 
delays. 
The duration of the workshop, including lunch, was estimated to be 2.5 hours. 
However, due to the multiple delays during the workshop this was extended to about 3.5 
hours from the 4 that were originally allocated. All three participants decided to stay and 




because the task was complex enough to at least take them an hour. The experimental 
session required an introduction to explain the rules of the experiment and the architecture 
of the software to modify which took about 15 minutes of the half hour that was left. 
Because of this situation, participants were allowed to work at their discretion on the task, 
and all of them dedicated approximately one hour to complete the task. 
We expected users would use the cheat sheet (Appendix B 8.9) as reference to carry out 
the task assigned. We assumed that the participants would select some of the sensitive 
fields during the interaction with the wizard to generate the mappings files. Analysing the 
logs collected, we discovered that the subjects did not interact with our prototype as we 
expected. The only interaction that appears in the logs is the examination of the combo 
box containing the list of encryption algorithms.  
Through the answers extracted from the exit questionnaire we were able to extract some 
qualitative data from the participants: 
 Two of them identified the difficulty of the task as average and one as easy; the 
source code collected from them corroborated this with its completeness level.   
 Participants declared that none of them had received any formal training about 
security even when two of them had professional experience developing software 
and one was enrolled in a program related to security. However, the study took 
place at the beginning of the school year and the participant was a new student. 
 One participant (P3) that correctly identified the application to being vulnerable to 
network attacks. The other two could not tell if it was vulnerable to any attacks. 
 All of the participants were aware of the presence of sensitive data in the 
application. They identified password, credit card and social insurance numbers as 
the most sensitive information and two of them identified the entire table as 
sensitive for containing personal information. 
 When asked what would be their suggestion to protect this data and only two 
provided an answer: encryption was suggested by both, but, one of them explicitly 




 Two of them qualified the difficulty of implementing encryption in their programs 
as average and the other one as easy. 
 The lack of time and the focus on functionality was identified as the main reason 
for not using the features added by the prototype. One of the participants declared 
that she had the intention to go through it later.  
 All participants had a good opinion about the usefulness of the encryption 
capabilities; their answers were measured using a likert scale with values that went 
from “not useful” (1) to “essential” (5), which is the maximum level. Their 
answers were for participant “useful” (3) to “very useful” (4) and “essential” (5). 
 Only one subject (P3) used the contextual help button and found the information 
presented relevant and the difficulty to understand it as average. 
 The easy encryption capabilities was one of the features that were well received by 
the users, one of the participants wrote: “I like how the tools had a simple way of 
implementing after the initial setup, as well as an easy way of adding encryption to 
sensitive user information.” 
 When answering the question about what they did not like about the tools, we 
received only one answer referring to Hibernate basic functionality: “They were 
very clunky to use for a small program; there was a lot of setup for a small amount 
of payoff. But this is necessary for larger applications to make proper use of 
them.” 
4.5 Analysis 
With the result at hand, we prepared to answer the questions posed at the beginning. It is 
important to highlight that these answers are based in the observations extracted from this 
small pilot study and they are not definitive or intended to be generalized. This results are 
only applicable the situation described here and further study is needed to draw more 
general conclusions. 





Under the laboratory conditions described and with an external factor of extreme time 
pressure, the Crypto-Assistant will not be effective to encourage the use of encryption. 
 Is it effective at raising awareness about the risk to which data at rest is exposed?  
All the participants were aware about the threat of lack of encryption of data at rest 
and its potential disclosure to unauthorized parties. 
 Are the features provided easy to understand and use? 
Even when the participants did not make use of the encryption features, one stated that 
one of the features she liked most was how easy it was to add encryption. These 
results along with the learnability evaluation performed suggest that user acceptance 
and effortlessness of use was attained. 
 In case the users do not use the encryption capabilities suggested and provided by 
the Crypto-Assistant, what is the reason?  
Time constraints were mentioned by all the participants, this element plays an 
important external factor that was not in our consideration through the development of 
the prototype. 
4.5.1 Lessons learned and experimental limitations 
There are some limitations with the approach of our experimental design. In this section 
we try to acknowledge the most relevant and explain how they might have influenced the 
results we observed and what was learnt from this experience.  
 The main limitations are: the limited number of participants in the study and the 
design of the experiment itself. Documentation about design and test of security tools is 
still scarce in consequence we had to develop our own methodology. Our ad-hoc 
approach was more focused on the testing of the hypothesis presented than in the 
improvement of the tool we were developing. It would have been better to first focus only 
in the development and evaluation of the prototype and then with the prototype ready, 




 The prototype design is another factor to consider. While designing the prototype, 
usability was the top most priority. We did not take into consideration the effect of 
external factors in users' goals. Even when we were aware of them and tried to use one in 
the form of an incentive offered with the purpose of including security indirectly as one of 
the participant’s goals. A redesign of the prototype would include making explicit the use 
of encryption by adding a new menu item to Eclipse user interface indicating clearly that 
encryption will be available. By indicating explicitly the use of encryption before even 
starting the process; we align with Witten’s [82] well in advance principle mentioned in 
section 2.4.3. The selection of this explicit menu item would imply the intention of the 
user to protect the data with encryption aligning the purpose of the prototype with the user 
intentions. 
 The developers’ goal was to perform the migration from JDBC to Hibernate and it 
was stated that this goal was the main task of the experiment. It was also mandatory to 
complete it in order to be eligible for one of the gift cards; therefore, the warning 
presented might have been perceived as an interruption that was on their way to finish the 
task requested. The use of encryption to protect the data was not an explicit goal. A new 
study comparing the performance of participants with the explicit goal of encrypting data 
with and without the support of the Crypto-Assistant prototype would shed new light on 
the efficiency of the prototype. 
The theoretical “information disclosure” risk might have been perceived as non-
existent due to the experimental nature of the task. Even when we tried to recreate a 
realistic setting the participants knew that it was just an experiment and the release of the 
data in the prototype would not affect them directly. 
The limitation in time was important too as the results obtained may differ if time 
pressure was not a factor. By adding a time constraint, the subjects had to optimize the 
resources they had. In this case the alternative presented to mitigate the risk involved the 
allocation of time to perform the risk mitigation task. Participants might have decided that 
the cost associated to perform the risk defusing task was not worth the potential benefit 




explicit functional goals to meet and missing those goals represented a greater risk in the 
context of the experiment. The time constraint was a determinant factor to prioritize 
functionality over any other feature. 
The unfamiliarity of participants with the prototype is another factor to consider. 
Participants’ lack of experience with the technologies and functions added by the 
prototype might be significant for the results of the experiment. This might have been an 
issue but, the demographics we were targeting justify this condition. 
There is also the threat of over encryption. Users might find that all the fields in a 
table are sensitive risking to over encrypting data which might render it unsearchable. 
This problem was not addressed and it is still present in the final version of the prototype.  
4.5.2 Implications of the results obtained from the pilot user study 
The results show that user goals are hard to change and external factors such as time 
constraints are an issue and suggest that a redesign must take place to improve the 
effectiveness of the Crypto-Assistant.  
In an effort to better understanding of what parts required more work, we found 
that the security threat model presented in [41] was ideal to evaluate our prototype. This 
model presents several factors that affect the security of a system and helps to evaluate if 
the system contributes to insecure behaviours by evaluating the security and usability in a 
user-centric way. By using that model it was possible to determine that there were some 
threats to security that our prototype was not addressing. Three of the security factors that 
are part of the model apply directly to the design of our prototype: 
Vigilance–secure systems tend to expect users to be alert and proactive in assessing the 
security state of a system. Even experts (people who understand the working of a secure 
system) are not always alert. Tasks that pose this security risk tend to be those that require 
users to divert attention from a primary task in order to attend to a security task. Such 




The prototype tried to incorporate encryption into the workflow of developers, in a 
non-intrusive way. This approach requires a user to be vigilant and proactive to defuse the 
information disclosure risk.  
Motivation–users have different levels of motivation to perform security tasks in different 
circumstances. Participants would be more motivated to perform a risk defusing operation 
if they perceive that a risk affects them more directly than in a case where the risk is 
perceived to be low or directed at someone else. 
 As mentioned before the lab setting and the experimental nature of the activity 
might be determined in the perception of participants about the risk mentioned in the 
warning. Time constraints also affected how the participants responded to the stimulus 
presented. 
Conditioning–repetitive security tasks for which users can predict an outcome can become 
a threat to the security of a system. A security-usability analysis of a system should assess 
whether security tasks have the potential for condition users.  
By using a warning we preconditioned the behaviour of the participants. People 
are used to dismiss warnings, a behaviour that could be explained by great exposure to 
many ineffective security warnings on computer systems. 
In the light of these results the need of a change in the design of our prototype is 
required. A solution to the defects detected in the version evaluated might be mitigated by 
adopting a different stand.  
Mitigation of the threats identified can be achieved through separation of concerns 
making awareness and functionality separate goals. The incorporation of a new menu item 
that explicitly enables the functionality added by the prototype addresses the three issues 
detected. First, it would make the prototype compatible with the principle of “well in 
advance” [82] information introduced by Whitten. The explicitness implies motivation 
from part of the user. It also defuses the need of vigilance and by moving away from the 
warning design conditioning is also addressed. This change in the design and approach 




and proactively looking for the incorporation and use of encryption in their applications 
which implies that they already performed an assessment and decided to use Jasypt in 
their database encryption strategy. The increase of awareness can be achieved through the 
same warning strategy adopted in this version and described in section 3.2.2. Embedding 
warnings in the workflow of other tools whose activities might be related to certain design 
risks and display security warnings at relevant points having in consideration that the 
earlier an error is detected the cheaper is to fix. 
4.6 Summary 
Despite the limitations in the realization of the user study, it provided valuable 
information about the developers’ mental model. The data collected shows that in general 
the prototype had good acceptance. Nevertheless, encryption was not used and despite the 
usability improvements the results suggest it was perceived as a time consuming task that 
was not aligned with the participants' functional goals. An evaluation of the results 





5 CHAPTER 5 – DISCUSSION AND 
CONCLUSION  
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we will discuss the results of the user study and the contributions of our 
work in addition to providing some suggestions for future directions for researchers in the 
field. The user study we performed showed that even when the participants received the 
functionality provided by the prototype with enthusiasm and were made aware of the risk 
of storing sensitive information in clear text by the warning presented, they did not used it 
to encrypt any data due to a lack of time. 
5.2 Discussion 
The results of the prototype evaluation suggest that the prototype was not effective in 
improving the use of encryption under time constraints. Functional requirements have a 
higher priority for developers over security concerns. The warning presented by the 
prototype was not able to persuade the participants to mitigate the risk they were being 
informed of, with the suggested strategy, even with the learnability and efficiency added 
by the tool.  
The experiments carried by Xie et al. [87] with professional developers influenced 
the development of our evaluation methodology and therefore have several similarities. 
Instead of a virtual machine, a laptop was set up and loaded with their prototype. Their 
ASIDE (Assured Software Integrated Development Environment) prototype performed 
static analysis on participants’ code and presented several warnings for problems detected. 
The fact that the purpose of the experiment was to test the prototype was hidden from 
participants. Their participants were assigned the task to build an online stock trading 
system; a project with basic functionality was included to help developers getting started.  
The results from [87] are similar to the ones we collected. They show that 




of the warnings presented were clicked on. Despite that, warnings were not successful in 
protecting user or their systems from the risk they were intended to prevent or mitigate. In 
both experiments participants showed their willingness to address those concerns if they 
have had more time. These results suggest that environmental factors such as time 
constraints have a significant and detrimental effect on software security and should be 
considered in the design of a security tool. 
From a psychological standpoint, there are several experiments that examine 
human behaviour on risky decisions [34],[19],[46]. Some of these studies focus on the 
effects of time pressure on the search for risk defusing operators [35]. A risk defusing 
operator (RDO) is an action intended by the decision maker to be performed in addition to 
an otherwise attractive alternative and expected to decrease the risk. However, their 
approach is different from ours, since those situations are purely hypothetical and do not 
require to perform any action which reduces their realism. In our experiment we had two 
risks: 
1. Disclosure of sensitive data, which was presented through the warning. 
2. Failure to deliver the required functionality that was given by the task context.  
The results of our experiment suggest that people perceived as a greater risk to their 
immediate goals, not having completely implemented the functionality we requested them. 
This is understandable because there is no benefit on fixing the security of a product that 
does not fulfil its functional requirements. These results could be explained by the 
findings of Kocher et al. [46] which found that when there are mixed losses and gains 
involved at the same time, subjects become more loss averse and more gain seeking under 
time pressure, depending on the framing of the prospects. Their results suggest the 
importance of goals or aspiration levels, as they refer to them, under time pressure. 
These findings reveal that the use of warnings to encourage the use of the 
functionality provided by our prototype might have not been the best approach. Warnings 
impose limitations about the amount and type of information that can be presented at once 
to the user. The adoption of a security solution must be carefully evaluated to assess if it 




the system. This type of assessment is difficult to perform when participants are in a rush 
to achieve a functional goal and the information presented to them is limited. 
5.3 Future research 
There are some avenues for future work in the functionality of the Crypto-Assistant, In 
future research the lessons learned and documented in section 4.5.1 would need to be 
applied to improve the Crypto-Assistant such as making explicit in the user interface that 
encryption is available.  
The evaluation methodology can be improved conducting a performance comparison, e.g. 
assigning the task to encrypt entity data to a set of participants both with and without 
Crypto-Assistant support. This approach would more accurately evaluate the benefits 
provided by our prototype. Another change of the evaluation would be to focus 
exclusively on usability problems and the improvement of the tool, using other techniques 
such as Cranor’s “the human in the loop” security framework [13] to analyze and improve 
the design of the prototype. 
The prototype can be improved by adding support for key management and key rotation. 
There is already some progress done to move the definition of the encrypted types to a 
separate file that would be managed by the Crypto-Assistant to minimize the exposure of 
the encryption keys.  
5.4 Conclusion 
The technical community has underestimated the security problem. We feel this work was 
not the exception. The development and testing of the Crypto-Assistant was more 
demanding and complex than we initially anticipated. However, the results and 
experience gained through the whole process was worth overcoming all the existing 
difficulties. 
The main goals of this research were producing a tool for security and help in the 
application of the “Built Security In” concept. We achieved those goals with the Crypto-




achieved this goal yet but hope that with the theoretical framework introduced in Chapter 
2; the design process in Chapter 3; and the user study in Chapter 4; we have condensed 
enough knowledge to serve as reference point for other developers. 
The material condensed in Chapter 2, the documentation of the development 
process, the design and the source code of Crypto-Assistant along with the data collected 
from the pilot study presented here are the contributions of this thesis. It is important that 
to remark that the results presented here are not conclusive, they are based in a small 
sample and are not intended to be generalized but rather a point towards ways that the 
design of Crypto-Assistant and the experiment can be improved, as previously mentioned 
in section 5.4. In the future the Crypto-Assistant code will be released for the benefit of 
the community. Future work includes more realistic evaluations with actual users, and 
work in areas that were left out of the scope of the work presented here, .i.e., key 
management, integration of visual metaphors and evaluation of the changes suggested by 
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8  Appendix B – Experiment Material  
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